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This paper presents evidence of favorable management of qualified pension plans with 
large proportion of highly compensated employees. Defined benefit pension plans that 
are dominated by highly compensated employees tend to contribute beyond the minimum 
amount required under Internal Revenue Code (flow effect) resulting in overfunded plans 
(stock effect) and then use aggressive actuarial assumptions to disguise the overfunding 
to avoid visibility costs (reporting effect). This favored treatment is less likely when the 
sponsoring firm has an active labor union (monitoring effect). These actions contradict 
the provisions under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and the Internal 
Revenue Code, which prohibit favorable treatment for highly compensated employees.  
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The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC), as amended, designates corporate 
pension plans that meet certain requirements as “qualified.”  A qualified status carries 
several tax advantages, such as, deductibility of contributions as expenses, exemption of 
earnings on plan assets from tax for employers, and exemption of contributions from tax 
for employees till disbursement, among many others. The Employee Retirement Security 
Act (ERISA) 1974 provides that qualified pension plans must benefit employees in 
general and not a limited number of favored officers, shareholders, and highly 
compensated employees (henceforth, HCE)
1.  Thus, the plans cannot discriminate with 
respect to coverage, contributions, or benefits.
2  In an effort to implement this mandate, 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued multiple regulations and rulings regarding 
benefit formula, salary base for benefit determination, vesting, employee contributions, 
and plan terminations. 
This paper examines the effectiveness of existing rules and regulations in curbing 
favored treatment of HCE dominant plans. The US pension law is very complex and the 
actuarial assumptions needed to determine accrued pension liability and annual 
contributions are extremely difficult to interpret and monitor. Using IRS Form 5500 
reports filed by private pension plans with the Department of Labor under provisions of 
ERISA, the paper shows that managers take advantage of this complexity and lack of 
                                                 
1 ERISA defines a highly compensated employee as an employee who is (A) a five percent owner, or (B) 
has compensation in excess of $80,000 (indexed for inflation from 1996) and (C) is in the top paid group 
of employees (top 20% by compensation). 
2 Firms can set up nonqualified deferred compensation plans for select executives or HCE. These are called 
top hat or supplemental executive retirement plans.  They are not qualified under ERISA and IRC, and are 
not subject to any funding, coverage, benefit, disbursement, or nondiscrimination rules.  The current paper 
examines the management of qualified pension plans only.    2
transparency of pension law to manage their pension plans in a manner that benefits the 
HCE to the detriment of non HCE. 
More specifically, the paper provides evidence that defined benefit (henceforth, 
DB) plans with higher proportion of HCE tend to over contribute beyond the minimum 
required by the IRC.  Over period of time, with the higher contributions, the plans end up 
as overfunded, but using actuarial manipulations the sponsoring firm disguises the 
overfunding and avoids political and visibility costs.     
This paper provides useful findings for federal agencies, such as, the Department 
of Labor and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) that monitor the operation 
of private pension plans to ensure equitable  coverage and distribution of benefits to all 
employees; the Department of Treasury and the IRS that ensure that the billions of dollars 
of tax benefits provided to such qualified plans are utilized for the intended objectives; 
and labor unions and employees who are interested in safeguarding the retirement income 
of the plan participants. The paper also adds to the existing literature on pension 
management and managerial manipulations to maximize personal gains. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses the 
theory and develops the hypotheses. Sections 2 and 3 explain the sample selection 
procedure and research design, respectively.  Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
section 5 the conclusion. 
 
I  THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
  In 2002, the total assets in qualified U.S. retirement income plans were over $10   3
trillion.  Of this amount, over $1.5 trillion was in private DB plans.
3 The total benefits 
paid out by private pension plans were over $300 billion and the annual contribution was 
over $190 billion.
4 At the beginning of 2002, there were over 53 thousand DB plans with 
over 41 million participants (Rajnes 2002). The value of the tax benefits to qualified 
pension plans in terms of foregone Federal revenues was estimated over $100 billion.
5 
Thus, private pension plans are a significant component of the U.S. economy.
6 The 
interest of regulators, investors, and employees in such plans has recently increased with 
the projected shortfalls in the Social Security system in the near future and PBGC 
deficits.  The rest of the section discusses the extant research and develops the 
hypotheses.  
    A.  Existing Research 
  This paper is related to two streams of research:  One that looks at the 
determinants of pension plan management, and the other that examines managers’ 
incentives to maximize their compensation through opportunistic discretionary decisions.   
A firm’s pension policy has three major components: funding policy, reporting policy, 
and investment policy.  Prior researchers have looked at the determinants of pension 
funding policy.  This research shows that financial slack (Feldstein and Morck 1983; 
Bodie and Papke 1992); effective tax rates, capital availability, debt equity ratios, and 
bonding of employees (Francis and Reiter 1987); corporate liabilities (Friedman 1983); 
and financial weakening and takeover threats (Mittelstaedt 1989) affect the funding 
                                                 
3 Source: EBRI Pension Investment Report: First Quarter 2003. The remaining assets pertain to defined 
contribution, Federal, State, and local government plans, and IRAs.  
4 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
5 Assuming a 35% corporate marginal tax rate with a 5% return on pension assets. 
6 Appendix 1 provides a brief overview of the US pension system.   4
decisions of firms.  Thomas (1989) and Ippolito and James (1992) investigate the causes 
of plan termination.   
  Prior research has also examined the firm’s strategic reporting choices of defined 
benefit pension benefits.  Firms can influence their reported defined benefit pension 
obligations by adjusting their actuarial choices.  Bodie et al (1987), Thomas (1988), 
Ghicas (1990), Thomas and Tung (1992), Godwin et al (1995), and Asthana (1999) study 
the determinants of actuarial choices for defined benefit pension plans.  They show that 
profitability, tax liability, working capital, debt, rate of undertaking of new investments, 
reimbursements to defense contractors, funded level, contribution level, excess cash from 
operations, and income management incentives motivate managers to strategically 
change their reported defined benefit pension obligations.  Bodie et al (1987), Friedman 
(1983), and others have examined firms’ investment policies.  McGill and Grubbs (1989) 
and Winklevoss (1993) discuss the various components of pension fund investment 
policy in detail. More recently, Bergstresser et al. (2004) conclude that managers 
manipulate assumed rates of return on pension assets as they exercise large amounts of 
stock options.  
  Agency theory predicts that management can fail to act in the best interests of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Healy (1985), Gaver et al. (1995), and 
Holthausen et al. (1995) find evidence that managers make discretionary accounting 
decisions to manipulate earnings and maximize their multi period bonus. Other empirical 
studies document the existence of CEOs’ opportunistic behavior when setting their own 
compensation (Yermack 1997; Balsam 1998; Gaver and Gaver 1998; Aboody and 
Kasznik 2000). Mallette et al.(1995), Sridharan (1996), and Core et al. (1999) find that   5
CEO duality increases CEO’s compensation. DeFond and Park (1997) argue that 
reputation concerns and the threat of displacement are likely to be incentives for 
managers to smooth earnings.  Bens et al. (2003) investigate whether firms’ share 
repurchases are due to incentives to manage diluted EPS. They report that firms manage 
EPS and increase their share repurchases when the effect of outstanding employees 
options on diluted EPS increases, and earnings are below the desired EPS growth level.  
Ericson et al. (2003) find that the likelihood of fraud increases with higher levels of 
bonus and stock backed grants.  Johnson et al. (2003) show that executives at fraud firms 
have greater potential payoffs via options and stock holdings from share price increase. 
Efendi et al. (2007) examine misstatements of financial statements and report evidence 
the likelihood of a misstatement increases greatly when the CEO has a sizable amount of 
stock options “in the money.”  
  Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) synthesize the research in the areas of pension and 
executive compensation and correctly label postretirement benefits for HCE as “stealth 
compensation” due to its opacity.  The current paper further extends the two streams of 
research by showing that highly compensated employees’ incentives to secure their post 
retirement benefits motivates them to overfund their pension plans through larger 
contributions and then avoid visibility costs by making aggressive actuarial choices. 
Since resources allocated to pension plans are limited, the actions of highly compensated 
employees are detrimental to the interests of less privileged employees. 
  B.  Development of Hypotheses 
  DB plans with larger proportion of risk averse HCE will use their influence to 
manage their pension plans to their advantage by using corporate funds to keep their   6
plans “safe” by overfunding them. Overfunded plans are safer since early termination of 
such plans will not result in participants losing their vested benefits.  On the contrary, 
underfunded DB plans have to depend on PBGC in case of termination and the PBGC 
insures only a portion of the benefits.
7 Plan terminations are not uncommon. During 
1997 2001, over 15 thousand DB plans terminated affecting over 2.7 million participants 
(Rajnes 2002). This provides motivation to highly compensated employees to use their 
influence to keep their plans overfunded. Overfunded status of DB plans can be achieved 
by over contributing to the plan each period.  ERISA and IRC require that firms make the 
“minimum required contribution” per period.  To lessen the burden on PBGC, the law 
also allows overfunding of DB plans.
8 Thus, plans can contribute to a “maximum tax 
deductible” limit.  Over time, this results in an overfunded plan. Thus, the first two 
hypotheses can be stated as:
9 
H1: Defined-benefit pension plans with larger proportion of highly compensated 
employees are more likely to have annual contribution in excess of the minimum 
contribution required by law. (FLOW EFFECT) 
H2: Defined-benefit pension plans with larger proportion of highly compensated 
employees are more likely to be overfunded. (STOCK EFFECT) 
  Overfunded pension plans can attract attention resulting in visibility costs. Prior 
research shows that overfunded plans are candidates for takeovers (Mittelstaedt 1989; 
Ippolito and James 1992). Labor negotiations in overrfunded firms are likely to focus on 
granting additional benefits to employees (Bulow, Scholes, and Menell 1983).  
                                                 
7 For example, in 2001 PBGC guarantees a maximum of $3,392.05 per month per worker (Rajnes 2002).  
Any vested benefits in excess of this amount can be lost on plan termination. 
8 Under provisions of the Pension Protection Act which subsequently became part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987 
9 All hypotheses are stated in alternate form.   7
Stockholders also face increased investment risks in overfunded plans (Asthana 1999). 
Thus, management has incentives to disguise plan overfunding. Firms make several 
actuarial choices, such as discount rate, actuarial cost method, salary growth rate, 
withdrawal rate, retirement age, mortality rate, etc. to estimate the pension liabilities and 
annual contributions of DB plans. The complexity of the pension law and the flexibility 
of actuarial choices make the pension calculation “soft” and discretionary (Scholes and 
Wolfson 1992).  Prior research, discussed above, shows that actuarial choices provide a 
convenient and safe tool for managers to disguise the overfunding of DB plans.  In 
addition, immunity from being sued for damages (Barrett 1993) and fear of termination 
motivates the actuaries to be indifferent over a range of actuarial values (Asthana 1999). 
Thus, hypothesis 3 states:       
H3: Defined-benefit pension plans with larger proportion of highly compensated 
employees are more likely to disguise their overfunded status through aggressive 
actuarial assumptions. (REPORTING EFFECT) 
  The DB plan is the major source of livelihood for employees after their 
retirement. Thus, employees will be interested in the proper management of the plans so 
that their benefits do not suffer. However, due to the very complex nature of pension 
accounting, individual employees will rarely possess the expertise to monitor the plans 
effectively. But if the employees are organized by labor unions, the monitoring will be 
more effective, given the increased resources and influence of unions over management. 
As a result, sponsoring firms with strong unions are less likely to mismanage DB plans in 
favor of HCE for fear of detection and ensuing visibility costs. The last hypothesis can 
now be stated as:   8
H4: The FLOW, STOCK, and REPORTING EFFECTS will be weaker in defined-
benefit pension plans that are sponsored by firms with strong unions. (MONITORING 
EFFECT) 
 
II  DATA SOURCE AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
ERISA (sections 104 and 4065) and IRC (sections 6047e, 6057b, and 6058a) 
require employee benefit plans to file individual annual reports on Form 5500 and 
corresponding schedules to the IRS. The IRS provides a copy of these reports to the 
Employee Benefits Security Administration division of the Department of Labor.  Data 
pertaining to Form 5500 and Schedules B (actuarial information), H (financial 
information), and T (coverage information) for the period 1999 2003 were obtained from 
the Department of Labor under the Freedom of Information Act.  For a qualified pension 
plan to be included in the sample: 
1.  The plan must have at least one year’s information available. 
2.  The plan must be a single employer plan 
3.  The plan must be a qualified DB plan.    
4.  The plan must have complete information on Form 5500, and Schedules 
B, H, and T 
Multi employer and multiple employer plans are dropped from the sample since it is 
difficult to model the individual firm’s incentives to manage the actuarial choices. 
Defined contribution plans are also dropped from the sample, since they do not make 
actuarial assumptions to estimate the minimum required funding levels. Table 1 shows 
the sample selection procedure.  The final sample consists of 31,288 observations   9
sponsored by 16,142 firms.
10 Financial variables needed in the analysis were obtained 
from the Compustat database. Employer identification numbers (EIN) were used to 
merge the two databases. This results in the Compustat sample of 2,115 observations 
sponsored by 831 firms.
11  
(insert table 1 about here) 
 
III  RESEARCH DESIGN 
To test the hypotheses, the paper defines a variable, HIPARTICIPANT to 
measure the proportion HCE in the plan as the number of benefiting employees who are 
HCE (item 4C(6) of Schedule T) divided by the total number of employees who benefit 
under the plan (item 4C(5) of Schedule T).  
  Both univariate and multivariate tests are conducted for hypotheses 1 4. Portfolio 
analysis is used for univariate tests. Multivariate analysis is carried out with the following 
system of five equations. 
CONTRIBUTION = β000 + β001 DY0 + β002 DY1 + β003 DY2 + β004 DY3  
+ β005 HIPARTICIPANT + β006 HIPARTICIPANT*UNION + β007 DEFICIENCY  
+ β008 FUNDINGRATIO + β009 DISCOUNTRATE + β010 WITHDRAWRATE  
+ β011 COSTMETHOD + β012 PORTFOLIORISK + β013 ACTIVERATIO  
+ β014 SALARYGROWTH + β015 SALARYBASED + β016 RETIREAGE  
+ β017 PLANSIZE + β018 UNION + Є0              (1) 
 
FUNDINGRATIO = β100 + β101 DY0 + β102 DY1 + β103 DY2 + β104 DY3  
+ β105 HIPARTICIPANT + β106 HIPARTICIPANT*UNION + β107 CONTRIBUTION  
+ β108 DISCOUNTRATE + β109 WITHDRAWRATE + β110 COSTMETHOD  
+ β111 PORTFOLIORISK + β112 ACTIVERATIO + β113 SALARYGROWTH  
                                                 
10 Plans have to clear one of the two nondiscriminatory tests, ratio percentage test or average benefit test, to 
be qualified.  90.56% of the sample plans passed the ratio percentage test and the rest the average benefit 
test. The two tests are discussed in detail in McGill and Grubbs (1989) and the instructions to Schedule T 
of Form 5500. 
11 The Compustat sample is approximately 7% of the full sample. This is consistent with the 8% sample 
obtained by Asthana (1999) with a manual merge.   10
+ β114 SALARYBASED + β115 RETIREAGE + β116 PLANSIZE + β117 UNION+ Є1  
                      (2) 
 
DISCOUNTRATE = β200 + β201 DY0 + β202 DY1 + β203 DY2 + β204 DY3  
+ β205 HIPARTICIPANT + β206 HIPARTICIPANT*UNION + β207 CONTRIBUTION  
+ β208 FUNDINGRATIO + β209 WITHDRAWRATE + β210 COSTMETHOD  
+ β211 MNDISCOUNTRATE + β212 PORTFOLIORISK + β213 ACTIVERATIO  
+ β214 SALARYGROWTH + β215 SALARYBASED + β216 RETIREAGE  
+ β217 PLANSIZE + β218 UNION + Є2              (3) 
 
WITHDRAWRATE = β300 + β301 DY0 + β302 DY1 + β303 DY2 + β304 DY3  
+ β305 HIPARTICIPANT + β306 HIPARTICIPANT*UNION + β307 CONTRIBUTION  
+ β308 FUNDINGRATIO + β309 DISCOUNTRATE + β310 COSTMETHOD  
+ β311 MNWITHDRAWRATE + β312 PORTFOLIORISK + β313 ACTIVERATIO  
+ β314 SALARYGROWTH + β315 SALARYBASED + β316 RETIREAGE  
+ β317 PLANSIZE + β318 UNION + Є3              (4) 
 
LOGIT(COSTMETHOD) = β400 + β401 DY0 + β402 DY1 + β403 DY2 + β404 DY3  
+ β405 HIPARTICIPANT + β406 HIPARTICIPANT*UNION + β407 CONTRIBUTION  
+ β408 FUNDINGRATIO + β409 DISCOUNTRATE + β410 WITHDRAWRATE  
+ β411 MNCOSTMETHOD + β412 PORTFOLIORISK + β413 ACTIVERATIO  
+ β414 SALARYGROWTH + β415 SALARYBASED + β416 RETIREAGE  
+ β417 PLANSIZE + β418 UNION + Є4              (5)
12 
 
where (in order of appearance):  
CONTRIBUTION is the employer’s annual contribution (in $ 000) per participant to the 
DB plan 
β are the regression coefficients and Є are the error terms 
DY0...DY3 are annual dummies for 2000…2003 (1999 is included in the common 
intercept) and control for any year specific effects or trends 
UNION is a trichotomous variable that captures the degree of participation in unions. The 
coding is based on the percentage of employees that are members of unions 
published by US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. If the 
participation rate for the sponsoring firm’s industry is 20% or more the variable is 
coded as 2; if the participation rate is 10% or more but less than 20% the variable 
is coded as 1; and 0 otherwise. 
DEFICIENCY is the beginning of the year funding deficiency under the US Pension law 
FUNDINGRATIO is the ratio of assets of the DB plan to its liabilities adjusted for 
actuarial biases (Appendix 2 discusses the debiasing procedure in detail) 
DISCOUNTRATE is the assumed discount rate used by DB plans to estimate their 
current pension liabilities
13  
                                                 
12 Equation 5 is run as a Logit regression since the dependent variable is a 4 level dummy variable.  
13 Discount rate has the maximum impact on pension estimates. A 1% increase (decrease) in discount rate 
results in a 16 30% decrease (increase) in annual contribution (McGill and Grubbs 1989).      11
WITHDRAWRATE is the assumed rate of employee withdrawal from the DB plan at age 
of forty years 
COSTMETHOD is a multilevel variables that denotes the liberalness of the actuarial cost 
method based on the classification used by Asthana (1999), Thomas and Tung 
(1992) and Winklevoss (1993). It takes the value three for unit credit/accrued 
benefit method; two for entry age normal method; one for attained age normal, 
frozen initial liability, individual aggregate, and aggregate methods; and zero for 
individual level premium method.
14 
PORTFOLIORISK is the riskiness of the DB plan investment portfolio and controls for 
the impact of firm’s investment policy on pension plan management. Asthana and 
Lipka (2002) rank the different categories of pension asset investments by their 
riskiness. Using their classification, corporate stocks (preferred and common), 
master trust investment accounts, and common/collective trusts are the most risky 
investments. The remaining categories, such as, corporate debt instruments, 
mutual funds, US Government securities, interest bearing cash, are less risky. 
PORTFOLIORISK is the proportion of total pension assets invested in corporate 
stocks (preferred and common), master trust investment accounts, and 
common/collective trusts 
ACTIVERATIO is the ratio of active to total plan participants and controls for participant 
profile 
SALARYGROWTH is the estimated annual increase in salary and is included since it 
affects the contributions  
SALARYBASED is a dichotomous variable with value of 1 if benefits are salary based 
and 0 if flat dollar based.  This variable controls for the differences arising out of 
benefits formula 
RETIREAGE is the assumed weighted average retirement age for the plan participants 
and controls for systematic variations with proportion of HCE.  
PLANSIZE is the natural logarithm of plan assets and controls for size related effects 
MN prefixed to a variable implies the industry mean for the 2 digit NAICS code. This 
represents the unbiased components of the actuarial estimates (Asthana 1999) 
 
These variables are summarized in Table 2. 
(insert table 2 about here) 
CONTRIBUTION is the annual cash flow to the pension plan and represents the 
flow effect. This variable should depend on the funding deficiency. Higher deficiency 
means accelerated contributions under ERISA. After controlling for other factors that 
may affect annual contributions to the plan, the coefficient on HIPARTICIPANT should 
capture the flow effect. H1 posits that the coefficient on HIPARTICIPANT will be 
                                                 
14 The actuarial cost methods are discussed in detail in Winklevoss (1993).   12
positive (flow effect). 
  The firm’s annual contribution will depend inversely on the firms funded status. 
Eventually, the firms funded status is the cumulative effect of annual contributions. 
Moreover, the annual contribution and funded status will depend mathematically on the 
actuarial assumptions. Conversely, the bias in actuarial assumptions may be a function of 
annual contribution and funded status. Finally, the actuarial assumptions may also be 
correlated with each other (Asthana 1999). As a result, the five dependent variables in 
equations 1 5 are not exogenous variables. To avoid this problem of endogeneity, the five 
equations are estimated as a system of simultaneous equations. 
  FUNDINGRATIO is the funded status of the plan at a given point in time and 
represents the pension stock. H2 predicts that DB plans with higher proportion of HCE 
will tend to be overfunded (stock effect). This implies a positive coefficient on 
HIPARTICIPANT in equation 2. The three actuarial variables, DISCOUNTRATE, 
WITHDRAWRATE, and COSTMETHOD are defined such that higher values denote 
liberal estimates (lower values of pension liability) and lower values denote aggressive or 
conservative estimates (higher values of pension liability).  H3 predicts negative signs for 
HIPARTICIPANT in equations 3 5 (reporting effect). In other words, HCE dominated 
plans will use aggressive assumptions to disguise their overfunded status and justify their 
excess contributions.  
  Finally, H4 posits that the flow, stock, and reporting effects will be milder in the 
presence of active unions due to the increased visibility and political costs (monitoring 
effect). If the monitoring effect exists, the coefficients on HIPARTICIPANT in equations 
1 5 will be closer to zero for firms with strong unions. This implies that the coefficients   13
on HIPARTICIPANT*UNION will be opposite to those on HIPARTICIPANT. Thus, 
HIPARTICIPANT*UNION will be negative in equations 1 and 2 and positive in 
equations 3 5.   
 
IV  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A.  Univariate Tests 
Table 3 presents the results of univariate analysis. Hypothesis 1 predicts that HCE 
dominated plans will contribute in excess of the minimum required contribution with the 
intention of eventually overfunding the plan. Panel A of table 3 shows the portfolio test 
for the flow effect. Since contribution is a direct function of funding deficiency of the DB 
plan, the research design tries to control for the level of deficiency by splitting the sample 
into high and low deficiency groups (DEFICIENCY above and below median).  Within 
each subgroup, two portfolios with proportion of HCE above and below median are 
further created.  CONTRIBUTION is then compared for high and low HCE portfolios 
within each subgroup of high and low DEFICIENCY. CONTRIBUTION is always 
significantly greater for the high HCE portfolio, suggesting that HCE dominated plans 
push more contribution per employee, holding every thing else constant (flow effect). 
This finding is consistent with H1.  
(insert table 3 about here) 
Panel B compares two portfolios with HIPARTICIPANT above and below median 
value.  As predicted by H2, FUNDINGRATIO is significantly higher for the HCE 
dominant group (HIPARTICIPANT > median), confirming that as the proportion of HCE 
in a DB plan increases they assert their influence to overfund the plan (stock effect). The   14
difference in FUNDINGRATIO between the two groups is 14.33%. For an average 
sample plan (with assets of $82 million) this translates to a difference of almost $12 
million in pension assets. DISCOUNTRATE, WITHDRAWRATE, and COSTMETHOD 
are all significantly lower (more aggressive) for the high HCE group in comparison to the 
low HCE group. Thus, to avoid political and visibility costs, HCE dominated plans make 
aggressive actuarial assumptions and disguise the overfunding and excess contributions 
(reporting effect). This supports H3. Mean values of the actuarial assumptions for each 
quartile of HIPARTICIPANT are plotted in figure 1. The systematic choices of more 
aggressive actuarial estimates with increasing proportion of HCE in the plan is clear from 
the plots in panels A, B, and C. 
(insert figure 1 about here) 
B.  Multivariate Tests 
Multivariate tests of H1 4 are reported in table 4.  Coefficients of 
HIPARTICIPANT are significantly positive in the first two and significantly negative in 
the last three regressions. These results are consistent with H1 3 and the univariate 
results. As the proportion of HCE in the DB plan grows, the plans tend to over contribute 
(flow effect); end up overfunded (stock effect); and then use aggressive actuarial 
assumptions to mask the overfunding (reporting effect).
15 The coefficients of 
HIPARTICIPANT in regressions 1 and 2 imply that the employer’s annual contribution 
goes up by $2,215 per participant and the funding ratio by 2% for every 10% increase in 
the proportion of HCE in the plan. HIPARTICIPANT*UNION is significantly negative 
                                                 
15 In other words, as the proportion of HCE increases, firms make more aggressive actuarial assumptions, 
to inflate their pension liabilities. The inflated pension liabilities deflate their reported funding ratios and 
justify higher annual contributions by increasing the minimum required and maximum tax deductible 
contributions, thereby, minimizing visibility costs.     15
in the first two regressions and significantly positive in regressions 3 and 4. The 
coefficient is insignificant in the last regression. This suggests that the flow, stock, and 
reporting effects are subdued in the presence of a strong union, consistent with H4 
(monitoring effect).  
(insert table 4 about here) 
  With regards to the control variables, DEFICIENCY is significantly positive 
(henceforth, positive) as expected. Higher shortfalls in the desired funding level result in 
accelerated annual contributions. ERISA requires this catch up funding with the intent of 
securing the benefits for participants and minimizing potential losses to PBGC in case of 
premature plan termination. CONTRIBUTION and FUNDINGRATIO are inversely 
correlated in equations 1 and 2, signifying that overfunded plans have lower annual 
contributions, consistent with ERISA provisions. In equations 3 5, these two variables are 
negative (with one exception) implying that plans indulging in overfunding are likely to 
make aggressive actuarial estimates to hide the overfunding. Likewise, 
DISCOUNTRATE, WITHDRAWRATE, and COSTMETHOD are negative in equations 
1 and 2. These three variables are positively correlated with each other in equations 3 5, 
suggesting that they are jointly determined (Asthana 1999) and tend to move together 
towards liberal or aggressive estimates.  
  Industry means (MNDISCOUNTRATE, MNWITHDRAWRATE, and 
MNCOSTMETHOD) in equations 3 5 are always positive implying co movement with 
industry trends. PORTFOLIORISK is significant in 4 cases; ACTIVERATIO in 2 cases; 
SALARYGROWTH, RETIREAGE, PLANSIZE, and UNION in all five cases; and 
SALARYBASED in 3 cases.   16
C.  Regression Diagnostics 
  The Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) test for multicollinearity is conducted on all 
the regressions reported in panel A of table 4 and the highest variance inflation factor 
(VIF) are reported. The highest VIF in all regressions are below the critical level of 10.  
Therefore, multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem. White's (1980) test for 
heteroskedasticity is also conducted on all the regressions.  The null of homoskedastic 
errors is rejected for all of them.  Consequently, White’s heteroskedasticity corrected t 
statistics are also estimated (not reported). The conclusions are unaltered.  Finally, the 
conclusions do not change when Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch’s (1980) procedure is used to 
remove outliers, therefore, all regressions are reported without outlier removal. These 
diagnostic procedures are also conducted on all subsequent regressions with similar 
conclusions. However, the results are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
D.  Intra-Firm Matched-Pair Design 
In addition to the full sample tests discussed above, the paper also conducts intra firm 
matched pair tests. Only firms with two or more DB plans in one year are retained in the 
test. The highest HIPARTICIPANT is matched with the lowest HIPARTICIPANT for 
that firm year. The second highest HIPARTICIPANT is matched with the second lowest 
HIPARTICIPANT, and so on, till only one or no plans are left for that firm year. The 
matched pair design insures that for every high HCE plan there is a matching low HCE 
plan from the same firm in the same year. This helps in controlling firm characteristics 
that may be omitted in the previous regressions.  This results in a reduced sample of 
2,770 observations (1,385 matched pairs). Regressions 1 5 are rerun with this sub sample   17
and reported in table 5. The results are similar to those of tables 4, suggesting that the 
earlier conclusions are robust with respect to omitted firm characteristics. 
(insert table 5 about here) 
E.  Additional Tests 
Controls for Sponsoring Firm’s Financial Characteristics 
  Prior research (Friedman 1983,; Bodie et al. 1987; Francis and Reiter 1987; 
Thomas 1988; Ghicas 1990; and Asthana 1999) has shown that the firm’s financial 
characteristics, such as, profitability, cash availability, tax rates, corporate debt, and 
growth opportunities can affect the plan funding and management. The Compustat 
subsample is used to run regressions 1 5 with the following additional control 
variables: 
DEBTRATIO is the ratio of sponsoring firm’s long term debt to its total assets at the 
end of the fiscal year; 
MARKET2BOOK is the ratio of sponsoring firm’s market value to book value at the 
end of the fiscal year; 
PROFITABILITY is the net income of the sponsoring firm during the fiscal year 
deflated by its total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 
CASH is the net cash from operating activities of the sponsoring firm during the 
fiscal year deflated by its total assets at the end of the fiscal year;  
TAXRATE is the total income tax deflated by the pretax income during the fiscal 
year.  
The results for this modified system of equations are presented in table 6. Panel A 
provides the distribution of these 5 financial variables and panel B the regression   18
estimates. Mean long term debt of sponsoring firms is 24.07% of the total assets and the 
market value is more than twice the book value. Mean net income (cash from operations) 
per dollar of assets is $0.0263 ($0.0770). On average, sponsoring firms pay taxes at the 
rate of 30.21%. The regression estimates corroborate earlier results and 
HIPARTICIPANT is in the predicted direction for all five cases. The significance level, 
however, are lower than those in table 4 (panel A). The smaller sample size could be one 
reason. Another reason could be that the subsample comprises only large firms due to 
merging with Compustat, and higher visibility costs for such firms result in less 
significant results. DEBTRATIO has negative impact on CONTRIBUTION and 
FUNDINGRATIO. One explanation can be that as firms get closer to debt covenant 
violations they minimize pension funding and divert the cash to pay debts. Similarly, 
MARKET2BOOK is negative in regressions 1 and 2 implying that high growth firms 
may have alternate uses for cash. PROFITABILITY, CASH, TAXRATE are positive as 
expected in regressions 1 and 2. More profitable firms and those with surplus cash are 
likely to overfund. Similarly firms with high tax rates are likely to maximize tax benefits 
by overfunding their pension plans. These control variables have, generally, opposite 
signs in the last three regressions because of the inverse relationship between funding and 
actuarial assumptions. 
(insert table 6 about here) 
Top Heavy Plans  
  As plans become “top heavy,” ERISA imposes extra restrictions with regards to   19
funding, vesting, etc. to safeguard the interests of non HCEs.
16  To make sure such firms 
are not driving the results, all plans with HIPARTICIPANT in the upper quartile are 
deleted (results not reported).  The conclusions are unchanged. 
Stock Market Trends   
The poor stock market performance during the 2000 2002 could affect the relative 
funded status of the sponsoring firm. Assume an investment portfolio that invests heavily 
in stocks. At the end of the bull market in 1999, the plan could be overfunded due to good 
performance of stocks. Eventually the bear market could reduce the same plan to an 
underfunded status in 2003 due to poor performance of stocks. On the other hand, a 
portfolio that invested in risk free assets will be relatively immune to the stock market 
volatility. Thus, FUNDINGRATIO might be systematically related to the investment 
profile and market performance. To determine if the market performance influenced the 
conclusions in any way, the test are conducted separately (not reported) for 1999 (end of 
bull market period) and 2003 (end of bear market period).  The conclusions are not 
affected. 
 
V  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  This paper examines the effect of HCE membership on the management of 
qualified pension plans.  Since HCE have the ability to influence corporate decisions, the 
paper posits that plans dominated by HCE will be provided favorable treatment.  Using a 
sample of plans that report on Form 5500 to the IRS/DOL for the period 1999 2003, the 
paper reports evidence that HCE dominated DB plans are more likely to have higher 
                                                 
16 IRC (§ 416) defines “top heavy” plan as a plan under which the value of accrued benefits for key 
employees exceeds 60% of the accrued benefits for all employees. Key employees include officers and 
owners as defined under IRC (§ 416 i).   20
contributions (flow hypothesis) and be overfunded (stock hypothesis) in comparison to 
non HCE dominated plans. HCE prefer overfunded plans since such plans are less 
dependent on PBGC for benefits in case of plan termination. HCE dominated plans also 
manage the actuarial assumptions to hide the overfunding with the intention of avoiding 
visibility costs (reporting hypothesis). These manipulations are less evident when the 
sponsoring firm has a strong and active labor union (monitoring hypothesis) because of 
the costs involved on detection.   
  Overall, the evidence is consistent with HCE exercising their influence to 
maximize their postretirement benefits and to minimize the associated detection risks.  
Given that the resources available for funding pension plans are limited, the preferential 
management of HCE dominated plans tends to adversely affect the expected 
postretirement benefits of non HCE dominated plans. This violates the letter and spirit of 
ERISA and IRC that prohibit any actions that benefit a privileged group of employees to 
the detriment of other less privileged employees.  The evidence also suggests that the 
current level of monitoring by regulatory agencies, such as the IRS, Department of Labor, 
Department of Treasury, and the PBGC is not enough to check the manipulation of 
postretirement benefits.  The paper develops tests that can help regulatory agencies 
strengthen the monitoring process. 
  Additional disclosures based on predetermined uniform actuarial values provided 
by the DOL could also be mandated. Though minimal in costs, such additional 
disclosures would significantly reduce the opaqueness of pension disclosures and reduce 
the opportunistic management of HCE dominated pension plans.   21
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APPENDIX 1 
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PENSION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
   
  The United States currently has one of the most extensively developed and complex 
pension systems that incorporates three major elements: (1) Public Social Security system 
under the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program; (2) Private 
pension system; and (3) Individual retirement savings (Hinz 2000).  US Government has 
always tried to encourage private pension plans that supplement public Social Security. 
Private pension benefits provide a critical component to the income security of today’s 
Americans, especially with the current problems facing the Social Security system.  
  As early as 1921, favorable tax treatment of the employment based retirement 
programs encouraged the expansion of U.S. pension system (Salisbury 2000).  The 
Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1926 granted additional tax breaks for tax qualified plans. 
Thus, the origin of private pension system pre dates the introduction of Social Security in 
the 1930’s. As pensions plans and participants grew in number after World War II, the 
Congress enacted The Revenue Act of 1942 that required that pension plans had to cover 
a broad cross section of employees, not just executives, and could not discriminate in the 
benefits paid or contributions made for officers, stockholders or other highly 
compensated employees.  The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 further strengthened the 
statutory base for the tax treatment of private pension plans. The Welfare and Pension 
Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 tried to provide employees with more information to make 
the management of pension plans more transparent.  However, abuse and 
mismanagement in the private pension system still existed and was dramatically 
highlighted by the Studebaker case in 1963 when the company stopped producing 
automobiles and over 4,000 workers lost significant portion of their vested pension 
benefits (Coleman 1993).  This resulted in the adoption of ERISA that affected plans 
from a legal, tax, investment, and actuarial standpoint, and included new reporting 
disclosure and fiduciary requirements (Rajnes 2002). 
  Pension plans are an important device to attract, retain, and ultimately encourage 
employees to retire (Bodie and Papke 1992). Pension plans are of two types: defined 
contribution (DC) and defined benefit (DB). In DC plans, a formula determines   25
contributions. The employee bears all the investment risk, and the firm has no formal 
obligation beyond making its annual contributions. In a DB plan, a formula that usually 
takes into account years of service and wages defines benefits. The investment risk is 
borne by the sponsoring firm or an insurance agency hired by the firm.  The PBGC, 
guarantees the vested pension benefits up to specified limits. 
  The IRC regulates the tax treatment of private pension plans. Private pension 
plans that meet the requirements of the IRC and federal regulations, issued from time to 
time, are said to be “qualified” for several tax benefits.
17  Employer contributions to 
qualified plans are deductible, subject to a maximum tax deductible limit, as ordinary and 
necessary business expenses for federal income tax purposes.
18  These contributions are 
not taxable to participants as income until paid out as benefits.
19  The earnings on the 
pension plan assets, including realized capital gains, are not taxable for the sponsoring 
firm.
20  Moreover, certain distributions from qualified plans are entitled to favorable tax 
treatment.
21  Finally, under the tax rules, firms are allowed to over fund their DB pension 
plans by up to the statutory limit with tax benefits.
22  For these reasons, “qualified” status 
is highly coveted by firms. But in return for the tax benefits, a “qualified” plan has 
responsibilities in regards to coverage, contribution, and benefits.  The plan cannot 
differentiate in favor of officers, shareholders, and highly compensated employees in 
regards to membership.
23 In addition to coverage, the plan cannot differentiate with 
respect to contributions or benefits.
24    
                                                 
17 IRC § 401(a) 
18 IRC § 404 
19 Treasury Regulations 1.402(a) 1(a) 
20 IRC § 501(a) 
21 IRC § 402(e)(4)(A) and IRC § 402(a)(2). For a more detailed discussion of the tax benefits available to 
qualified pension plans and its participants, see McGill and Grubbs (1989) 
22 Under provisions of the Pension Protection Act which subsequently became part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987 
23 IRC § 410 (b) requires that the plan pass either the “percentage test” or the “average benefit test” 
24 IRC § 401(a)(4)   26
APPENDIX 2 
ESTIMATION OF UNBIASED FUNDING RATIO 
 
Asthana (1999) uses a linear regression model to remove the bias arising from 
manipulation of actuarial assumptions.  An extension of that method is used to estimate 
FUNDINGRATIO.  The reported funding ratio (RFUNDINGRATIO) is the ratio of 
pension assets to pension liabilities, and pension liabilities are a function of the actuarial 
assumptions.  Thus, RFUNDINGRATIO can be expressed as: 
 
RFUNDINGRATIO = β0 + β1 DISCOUNTRATE + β2 WITHDRAWRATE  
+ β3 COSTMETHOD + β4 SALARYBASED + β5 SALARYGROWTH  
+ β6 ACTIVERATIO + β7 RETIREAGE + error        (A) 
 
The remaining variables are as defined in the text and table 2. Unbiased 
FUNDINGRATIO can then be estimated, as in Asthana (1999), by removing the effects 
of manipulated actuarial assumptions and replacing with the mean actuarial assumptions 
for the industry (2 digit NAICS code) in that year (denoted by the prefix MN) in equation 
(A). 
 
FUNDINGRATIO =  
RFUNDINGRATIO + β1 (MNDISCOUNTRATE – DISCOUNTRATE)  
+ β2 (MNWITHDRAWRATE – WITHDRAWRATE) 
+ β3 (MNCOSTMETHOD – COSTMETHOD)          (B) 
 
DISCOUNTRATE, WITHDRAWRATE, and COSTMETHOD are all inversely related 
to pension liability, and, therefore, positively related to RFUNDINGRATIO (Winklevoss 
1993).  Thus, to disguise overfunding, HCE dominated plans will make aggressive 
actuarial assumptions (lower values of DISCOUNTRATE, WITHDRAWRATE, and 
COSTMETHOD) resulting in lower RFUNDINGRATIO.       27
 TABLE 1 
SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURE 
   
         
Procedure  Plan Year Observations  
Available plan year observations on 1999 2003 ERISA files  662,387 
Single Employer pension plans  634,289 
Qualified Defined benefit plans  35,594 
Complete Data on Form 5500 and Schedules B, H, and T  
†31,288
 
Data also available on COMPUSTAT 
††2,115 
 
† Sponsored by 16,142 firms. 
 
†† Sponsored by 831 firms. 
   28
TABLE 2 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
(in alphabetical order) 
 
Variable    Definition 
ACTIVERATIO 
 
The ratio of active plan participants to total plan participants (active, 
retired, and deceased participants entitled to benefits) 
CASH  Net cash from operating activities deflated by total assets 
CONTRIBUTION 
 
The annual contribution (in $ 000) per participant by the employer to 




A multilevel variable with value of 3 for unit credit method; 2 for entry 
age normal method; 0 for individual level premium method; and 1 for 
all other actuarial cost methods  
DEBTRATIO  Ratio of long term debt to total assets 
DEFICIENCY 
 
The funding deficiency per plan participant (in $ 000) at the beginning 
of the year 
DISCOUNTRATE 
 
The assumed discount rate used by defined benefit pension plans to 
estimate their current pension liability 
DYi  Dummy variable for year i 
FUNDINGRATIO 
 
The ratio of current assets of the defined benefit pension plan to its 
total liabilities adjusted for actuarial biases 
HIPARTICIPANT  The ratio of highly compensated participants (as defined under ERISA) 
to the total number of  plan participants 
MARKET2BOOK  Market to book ratio 
MN          
 
When prefixed to a variable implies the mean for the two digit NAICS 
industry code in that year 
PLANSIZE  Natural logarithm of pension assets of plan 
PORTFOLIORISK  The riskiness of the defined benefit pension plan investment portfolio 
PROFITABILITY  Return on assets  
RETIREAGE  The assumed weighted average retirement age of plan participants 
SALARYBASED 
 
Dummy variable with value of 1 if defined benefits are salary based; 
and 0 if benefits are flat dollar based 
SALARYGROWTH  The estimated annual increase in salary  
TAXRATE  Total income tax deflated by pretax income. 
UNION 
 
Trichotomous variable with value of 2 (1) if 20% (10%) or more 
employees in the industry are members of union; and 0 otherwise 
WITHDRAWRATE  The assumed rate of withdrawal from the defined benefit pension plan    29
 TABLE 3 
PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS BY PROPORTION OF HIGHLY COMPENSATED 
PARTICIPANTS 
 





(DEFICIENCY > Median) 
Low Deficiency 
(DEFICIENCY < Median) 
Proportion of Highly Compensated Participants 
 >  Median 
(N = 7,822) 
< Median 
(N = 7,822) 
 >  Median 
(N = 7,822) 
< Median 
(N = 7,822) 




               ***41.75 
                  (0.0001) 
             ***46.35 
               (0.0001) 
 
 




Proportion of Highly Compensated Participants    







































See table 2 for variable definitions. 
† Satterthwaite t statistics (all variances are significantly different) 
*** implies significance at 1% level (two sided).  
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TABLE 4 





CONTRIBUTION  FUNDINGRATIO  DISCOUNTRATE  WITHDRAWRATE  COSTMETHOD 
Intercept  ***36.0943  ***0.5349  ***3.2344  ***4.0790  ***4.5498 
HIPARTICIPANT  ***24.4616  ***0.1054  *** 0.2029  *** 1.8075  *** 0.6887 
HIPARTICIPANT*UNION  *** 7.7986  ** 0.0427  *0.0359  **0.2378  0.0884 
DEFICIENCY  **0.0330         
CONTRIBUTION    *** 0.0044  *** 0.0021   0.0001  *** 0.0078 
FUNDINGRATIO  *** 0.8250    *** 0.0569  *** 0.1560  *** 0.1215 
DISCOUNTRATE  *** 1.7894  *** 0.0512    ***0.4247  ***0.3396 
WITHDRAWRATE  *** 0.0732  *** 0.0024  ***0.0220    ***0.0366 
COSTMETHOD  *** 0.4266  *** 0.0114  ***0.0471  ***0.1464   
MNDISCOUNTRATE      ***0.3639     
MNWITHDRAWRATE        ***0.3705   
MNCOSTMETHOD          ***1.3063 
PORTFOLIORISK  0.2137  *** 0.1243  **0.0214  ***0.3822  ***1.6506 
ACTIVERATIO  ***6.5007  ***0.2017   0.0002  0.0003   0.0005 
SALARYGROWTH  *** 0.1084  *** 0.0054  **0.0035  ***0.4383  ***0.1062 
SALARYBASED  ***1.5226  0.0008  ***0.0355  0.0055  ***0.8922 
RETIREAGE  *** 0.3631  *** 0.0021  ***0.0083  ***0.0198  ***0.0153 
PLANSIZE  *** 0.3835  ***0.0677  ***0.0135  ***0.0423  ***0.0191 
UNION  ***0.5910  ***0.0348  *** 0.0258  *** 0.3215  *** 0.2325 
Observations  
Adjusted R Square 
F / Wald Chi Sqr Value 














  2,221.67 
<0.0001 
2.2471 






















0.0001   31
TABLE 4 (continued) 
 
See table 2 for variable definitions. MN prefixed to a variable implies the mean for two digit NAICS industry code. Annual dummy 
variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
 
*** implies significance at 1% level; ** implies significance at 5% level; * implies significance at 10% level (all two sided).   32
TABLE 5 





CONTRIBUTION  FUNDINGRATIO  DISCOUNTRATE  WITHDRAWRATE  COSTMETHOD 
Intercept  ***22.9922  ***0.3304  ***5.8583  **2.1320  **2.4787 
HIPARTICIPANT  ***23.9692  ***0.1234  ** 0.1557  *** 2.2755  ** 0.7568 
HIPARTICIPANT*UNION  *** 13.8525  * 0.0244  **0.2282  *0.7953  0.0731 
CONTRIBUTION    *** 0.0022  *** 0.0047  ** 0.0092  * 0.0095 
FUNDINGRATIO  * 0.2770     0.0175  * 0.1771  *** 0.2288 
DISCOUNTRATE  *** 1.6233  * 0.0198    ***0.4643  ***0.4318 
WITHDRAWRATE  *** 0.0832   0.0008  ***0.0164    *0.0309 
COSTMETHOD  *** 0.2644  *** 0.0216  ***0.0534  ***0.1695   
UNION  ***1.2593  ***0.0329  ** 0.0492  *** 0.4931   0.0130 
Observations  












See table 2 for variable definitions. Annual dummy variables and other control variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
*** implies significance at 1% level; ** implies significance at 5% level; * implies significance at 10% level (all two sided).   33
TABLE 6 
ADDITIONAL TESTS WITH CONTROLS FOR FIRMS’ FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
Panel A: Distribution of Financial Characteristics  
(N = 2,115) 
 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Standard Deviation 
DEBTRATIO  0.2407  0.2291  0.2050 
MARKET2BOOK  2.0531  1.6047  2.1367 
PROFITABILITY  0.0263  0.0267  0.0879 
CASH  0.0770  0.0724  0.0747 
TAXRATE  0.3021  0.3455  0.1168 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
 





CONTRIBUTION  FUNDINGRATIO  DISCOUNTRATE  WITHDRAWRATE  COSTMETHOD 
Intercept  ***7.0356  ***0.8385  ***3.1187  *2.5967  ***5.9612 
HIPARTICIPANT  ***3.8411  *0.1042  ** 0.3453  * 1.2886  * 1.0154 
HIPARTICIPANT*UNION  *** 1.4640  ** 0.1548  *0.2251  *0.4807  0.4877 
CONTRIBUTION    *** 0.0253   0.0393   0.0191  ** 0.0462 
FUNDINGRATIO  *** 0.4928     0.0014   0.0693   0.1500 
DISCOUNTRATE  *** 1.2459  * 0.0185    0.0961  0.1516 
WITHDRAWRATE  0.0032  *** 0.0098  0.0036     0.0277 
COSTMETHOD  *** 0.1571  *** 0.0215  0.0118  0.0884   
DEBTRATIO  * 0.1998  ** 0.0555  ***0.1973  0.8541  ***1.5753 
MARKET2BOOK  * 0.0327  * 0.0019  ***0.0184  ***0.0297  0.0011 
PROFITABILITY  *0.7313  **0.1536  *** 0.5748   0.2499   0.0438 
CASH  ***1.6360  *0.0666   0.2384   1.2767  *** 2.1134 
TAXRATE  **0.5841  **0.0977   0.0946   0.7599   0.3304 
UNION  ***0.2418  *0.0214   0.0106   0.1811   0.1951 
Observations  












See table 2 for variable definitions. Annual dummy variables and other control variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. 
*** implies significance at 1% level; ** implies significance at 5% level; * implies significance at 10% level (all two sided)   35
FIGURE 1 
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See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 